January 15, 2006 Intelligence Briefing:
The Foam That Ate the Space Shuttle? Part 2: A Rigged Investigation
But from the outset the official investigation board, thrown together by outside political forces and headed by non-NASA figures with limited relevant experience, pushed away from any such possibility. That meant they had to blame the incident on some factor acting on the shuttle from the outside. There wasnt much to work with. In more than 100 flights over two decades, the programs five shuttles had provided considerable engineering experience. Every single flight had returned with damage: hundreds of gouges and pock marks, holes, missing heat-shield tiles. None of it had ever come close to threatening the orbiters. The boards investigators could find evidence of only one notable external event. Video footage showed a modest piece of light foam falling off the fuel tank and possibly striking the shuttles left side during launch. That, too, wasnt exactly an unusual occurrence; most shuttle flights lost chunks of foam, several of which hit the craft without incident. But lacking any better alternative, the board quickly seized on the foam hypothesis to steer clear of investigating terrorism. Almost from the beginning of the inquiry, board members ignored everything but the minor bits of evidence that could be interpreted as if the foam had hit Columbias left wing and that the wing alone had sustained all the damage. Any other evidence would immediately end that hypothesis, and was therefore sidelined. The board, however, faced the problem that a thorough investigation of any potential foam danger had already been done. While Columbia was still orbiting in space during late January, engineers from NASA and Boeing Co. carefully examined the issue just to make sure the shuttle was in no danger before reentry. Drawing upon the video record, shuttle blueprints, and powerful computers to caculate every possible scenario according to the laws of physics, the engineers concluded that the foam must have struck the heat-resistant tiles on the shuttles underbelly.1 Under two worst-case scenarios, NASA investigators [said], the [foam] insulation either would have destroyed a single heat-resistant tile near the landing gear door or caused damage to a 32-by-7-inch patch of tiles along the shuttle fuselage.2 Either way, the engineers unanimously agreed there was nothing to worry about. Even if the foam insulation had caused significant damage, the crew would have a safe return, they reported.3 Even after the disaster, the engineers remained confident of their analysis. Some engineers do not believe that any scenario would have been destructive enough to cause Columbia to crash, one news report reluctantly admitted (some engineers was the euphemism used by the reporters for all expert engineers involved in the program).4 Within weeks, tests of foam striking heat-shield tiles were proving the engineers right; as expected, the tiles were not seriously damaged.5
The testing began with equivalently sized foam pieces, fired from large gas guns to duplicate the conditions in which the insulation struck Columbia, and aimed at mock-ups of the wings leading edge. The speed was edged up to 530 mph and the foam was aimed more directly at the leading edge, at a sharper angle than the shuttle experienced. The results were still disappointing. One test slightly displaced the panel; others created 3 to 5-inch cracks. Six tests over several weeks showed nothing serious enough to make the point.8 So again the story changed. The frustrated board members reworked and eliminated data until they announced that the foam had instead taken a stroll in mid-air in an odd direction, striking not panel 6, but panel 8, located further away from the shuttle body and, also conveniently, a bit more fragile in construction. They repeated the gas-gun test, squeezing the speed up another notch and turning the foam chunk so that an entire edge would strike the mock-up panel with greater force. This time the impact did produce a hole, 16 inches in diameter.9 Not wanting to look a gift horse too closely in the mouth, the board instantly declared the case closed and stopped all further testing. Yet even if the foam did manage to wander sideways and backward, striking panel 8 and leaving a hole none of which the testing proved that only creates more questions than it answers:
The discrediting of the foam hypothesis re-opens the question of whether an internal catastrophic event destroyed Columbia, a sign of possible terrorism. It also raises red flags about the real agenda of the board members charged with handling the investigation. References
1. Vartabedian, R., NASA focuses in on shuttles leading edge, Los Angeles Times, March 27, 2003, p. A18; Vartabedian, R., Report likely to say NASA minimized foam peril, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 26, 2003, pp. A1, A16.
2. Gold, S. & Vartabedian, R., NASA considering space hit, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 5, 2003, pp. A1, A19.
3. Gold, S. & Vartabedian, R., Breach in shuttle suspected, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 14, 2003, pp. A1, A22.
4. Gold, S. & Vartabedian, R., NASA considering space hit, Op cit.
5. Vartabedian, R., Tests shed light on Columbia damage, Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2003, p. A20.
6. Associated Press, Foam theory is bolstered by shuttle data, Los Angeles Times, March 31, 2003, p. A19.
7. Vartabedian, R., NASA focuses in on shuttles leading edge, Op cit.
8. Associated Press, Foam test bolsters shuttle theory, Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2003, p. A39; Vartabedian, R., Foam test shows impact doomed Columbia, Los Angeles Times, June 7, 2003, pp. A1, A20-21; Alonso-Zaldivar, R. & Vartabedian, R., Two more shuttle safety defects cited, Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2003, p. A20.
9. Hart, L. & Vartabedian, R., Shuttles smoking gun seen, Los Angeles Times, July 8, 2003, pp. A1, A16.
10. Vartabedian, R., Near proof of shuttles fatal flaw, Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2003, pp. A1, A19.
11. Gold, S. & Vartabedian, R., Heat damage found on shuttle wing section may be key clue, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 28, 2003, p. A23.
12. Vartabedian, R. & Pae, P., Clues point to shuttle wing edge, Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2003, pp. A1, A32; Vartabedian, R., NASA focuses in on shuttles leading edge, Op cit.
13. Vartabedian, R., Near proof of shuttles fatal flaw, Op cit.
14. Gold, S. & Vartabedian, R., Breach in shuttle suspected, Op cit.
15. Vartabedian, R. & Pae, P., Shuttle investigators look at possibility of weakened wing, Los Angeles Times, March 12, 2003, p. A16.
16. Associated Press, Gases breached wing of Atlantis, Los Angeles Times, July 9, 2003, p. A21.
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